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INTRODUCTION 
It was not until 2002 that trial began for the October 30, 1975 murder of fifteen-year old 
Martha Moxley.1  The case against the accused, Michael Skakel, who was also fifteen years old 
at the time of the murder, was both old and lacking in strong forensic evidence.   Skakel argued 
that he was elsewhere at the time of the murder and the prosecution had no eyewitnesses who 
could testify otherwise.2  To convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of Skakel’s guilt would 
be no small task.  To overcome the challenge, the prosecution used an interactive multi-media 
evidence presentation system.  All of the photographs, documents, diagrams, and video and 
audio recordings were digitized and placed on CD-rom, allowing the prosecution to display 
them, with nothing but the click of a mouse, on a large monitor directly behind the testifying 
witnesses.3   
By using technology to visually present the evidence, the prosecution not only saved trial 
time usually spent passing documents from one juror to the next, but was also better able to focus 
the jury’s attention on the substance of the testimony being presented.4  For example, while the 
detective who collected much of the physical evidence from the scene testified, the prosecution 
displayed an aerial photograph of the area, zoomed in, and labeled the areas where particular 
items were found.5   In short, by using courtroom technology to visually present the evidence, the 
prosecution put on a seamless performance that clarified the evidence, captivated the audience, 
                                                 
1 Brian Carney & Neal Feigenson, Visual Presentation in the Michael Skakel Trial: Enhancing Advocacy through 
Interactive Media Presentations, 19 CRIM. JUST. 22, 22 (2004). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 24. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 26. 
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and convinced the jury of Skakel’s guilt.6  Skakel was convicted and sentenced to a term of 
twenty years to life.7 
 The advantages of using of courtroom technology8 to visually present one’s case include 
enhanced juror comprehension and retention of the information presented, increased persuasive 
impact, and more efficient trials.9  As such, the use of courtroom technology will soon be, if it is 
not already, a necessary component of modern litigation.  This paper addresses an issue that to 
date has been ignored by legal scholars and practitioners: whether and to what extent lawyers’ 
ethical obligations are implicated as technology-augmented litigation becomes the norm.  More 
specifically, this paper considers whether lawyers have any ethical obligations in connection 
with the use of courtroom technology and if so, whether the current Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“Model Rules”) adequately express those obligations or whether the ABA Commission 
on Ethics 20/20 (the “Commission”) should consider amending the Model Rules to better do so. 
 Part I contains a discussion of the current status of courtroom technology, including the 
types of evidence display systems available, the types of computer-generated exhibits most 
commonly used, and statistical information demonstrating the ever-increasing role technology 
plays in modern litigation.  Part II contains a discussion of the effectiveness of using courtroom 
technology to visually present one’s case, including an explanation of several scientific theories 
and studies demonstrating that people are visual learners and that visually presented information 
                                                 
6 Id. at 24. 
7 State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 639 & n.2 (2006). 
8 As used in this article, the term “courtroom technology” refers only to evidence display technologies and the 
computer-generated exhibits displayed using those technologies.  See discussion infra Part I.A-B (describing the 
different types of evidence display technologies and computer-generated exhibits available).  In other contexts, 
however, the term may encompass other courtroom-related technologies such as electronic docketing and video-
conferencing, as well as access to e-filed materials, real-time court record transcripts, or the internet while in the 
courtroom.  See Frederic I. Lederer, High-Tech Trial Lawyers and the Court: Responsibilities, Problems, and 
Opportunities, 52 FED. LAW. 41, 42 (2005) (defining courtroom technology to include all of the above technologies 
and categorizing them as either “evidence presentations, court records, [or] data access and communications”). 
9 See discussion infra Part II.A-C. 
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is more persuasive and has a greater impact than information presented only verbally.   Finally, 
Part III examines whether the current Model Rules adequately address courtroom technology and 
concludes that because they do not, the Commission should consider courtroom technology 
specifically as part of its general technology discussion.10   
I. THE VIRTUAL COURTROOM: TODAY’S TECHNOLOGY-AUGMENTED LITIGATION 
 The use of technology in litigation is not a new phenomenon.   For more than thirty years, 
lawyers have used equipment such as overhead projectors, television sets, and VCRs in the 
courtroom to present their cases.11  Today’s courtroom technology, however, provides lawyers 
with much more sophisticated and versatile options. 
A.   Modern Evidence Presentation Systems 
 Evidence presentation technologies are those technologies “which provide a way to 
present evidence electronically and simultaneously to everyone in the courtroom.”12  In any 
given courtroom, the evidence presentation system may include a variety of different 
components.  Available technologies include the following: (1) evidence cameras; (2) laptop 
computers equipped with presentation software, such as Trial Director, Sanction, Trial Pro, or 
Microsoft’s PowerPoint; (3) electronic whiteboards; (4) digital monitors, which vary in size and 
can be located anywhere in the courtroom including the bench, behind the witness stand, and in 
the jury box; (5) digital projectors and projection screens; (6) annotation equipment; (7) 
integrated lecterns; and (8) kill switch and control systems.13   
                                                 
10 See discussion infra Part III.A-C. 
11 See DEANNE C. SIEMER ET AL., NAT’L ASSOC. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, EFFECTIVE USE OF COURTROOM 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 20-21 (2002) [hereinafter LAWYER’S GUIDE] 
(describing the “legacy equipment” (i.e. older equipment) available in courtrooms). 
12 Elizabeth C. Wiggins, The Courtroom of the Future is Here: Introduction to Emerging Technologies in the Legal 
System, 28 LAW & POL’Y 182, 186 (2006). 
13 Id.; LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 11, at 6-20. 
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By way of illustration, one of the most common evidence presentation technologies is the 
evidence camera.  Equipped with a very small video camera, it captures color images of 
whatever is placed on its base (photos, documents, x-rays, etc.) and transmits the data to an 
external monitor or projection screen for display.14   Because evidence cameras have zooming 
capabilities, the user can enlarge images or portions of images, which can help focus the fact 
finder’s attention.15  The user can also mark up or highlight the document (or other exhibit) while 
it is being displayed, further clarifying the point at issue.   
Laptop computers with presentation software can allow for even more sophisticated 
presentation techniques.  For example, both Trial Director, from InData Corp., and Sanction, 
from Verdict Systems, allow the user to display and manipulate the digital images in a variety of 
ways.16  The user can emphasize certain portions of documents through highlighting, 
underlining, zooming in, or using the “call-out” feature, which allows the user to pull out and 
enlarge certain portions of the text.  These programs also allow for the juxtaposition of two pages 
for side-by-side comparisons, the display of deposition video with synchronized scrolling text 
displayed along-side, and many other dynamic methods of presenting information.17 
In addition to the aforementioned technologies, which are the most common, there are 
even more sophisticated possibilities available.  These more advanced technologies, however, 
which include immersive virtual reality and holograms, are often more expensive and rarely 
used.18  Immersive virtual reality equipment permits the viewer, who wears a head-mounted 
                                                 
14 LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 11, at 6-7. 
15 Id. at 7-8. 
16 Id. at 10. 
17 JOANNA GALLANT ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF COURTROOM LITIGATION: JURY RESEARCH & ANALYTICAL GRAPHICS 
357 (2008); April Tate Tishler, The Animated Attorney: Effective Use of Demonstratives in Jury Trials, 780 P.L.I. 
LITIG. 861, 870 (2008). 
18 LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 11, at 38-39. 
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display, to feel as if he or she is actually in the particular scene.19  Holograms, which are created 
through the use of specially manipulated laser beams, are three-dimensional images that appear 
to “hang in midair” and can replicate the particular object or person and its motions exactly.20    
B.  Computer-Generated Exhibits 
 In addition to providing new methods for displaying exhibits in the courtroom, computers 
have also changed the types of exhibits lawyers use to present their cases.  Computer-generated 
exhibits (CGEs) are generally divided into six categories: static images, enhanced images, 
animations, recreations, simulations, and computer-models.21  The first category, static images, 
consists of non-moving images that are either created or stored electronically and electronically 
displayed in the courtroom.22  These images do not move and cannot be enhanced in anyway.23  
Static images include tables, graphs, maps, diagrams, and illustrations.24 
 The second category of CGEs, enhanced images, could be described as “occupying the 
space between static images and animations.”25  These images, although initially presented in 
static form, are subject to computer-driven manipulation.  For example, the attorney or witness 
may highlight or enlarge particular areas, use split screen presentation, or emphasize particular 
elements using zoom, different colors, arrows and the like.26 
 An animation is simply a series of static images shown in rapid succession, thereby 
creating the illusion of motion.27  Animations do not attempt to recreate or simulate the actual 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 136, 137 (E.D. N.Y. 2004); Fred Galves, 
Where the Not So Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for 
Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 177-185 (2000). 
22 Galves, supra note 21, at 177-78; KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 375 (6th ed. 2006). 
23 Galves, supra note 21, at 178. 
24 Verizon, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 137. 
25 Id. at 138. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 137-38; BROUN ET AL., supra note 22, at 376. 
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event; rather, they are meant only to accompany and illustrate the testimony of a witness.28  The 
input data is nothing more than the witness’s own memory or knowledge.29  With an animation, 
the images can be manipulated so as to depict the scene from varying viewpoints and distances.  
Thus, an animation can be used to illustrate testimony in ways that an actual video or photograph 
could not.  For example, an animation could depict the image of a handgun underneath its 
surface by making the outer casing appear transparent, and illustrating its inner chambers and 
mechanical devices in a much more effective manner than oral testimony alone would provide.30 
 Apart from animations, moving CGEs also include recreations and simulations.  Most 
literature combines recreations and simulations into a single category of CGEs, using the terms 
interchangeably.31   Simulations, or what most literature refers to as “simulations or recreations,” 
are intended to recreate the actual event in the way that it “must have happened.”32 The input 
data is not merely the eyewitness’ description, as with an animation, but rather scientific 
principles, data, and variables.33  With a simulation, empirical data such as the size and shape of 
an object, time, altitude, and velocity are fed into a computer that synthesizes the information “to 
yield output in the form of a visual presentation that conforms to the laws of physics and 
science.”34  Thus, with a simulation, an event can be depicted visually even when there are no 
eyewitnesses to testify.35 
                                                 
28 Verizon, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 138; Galves, supra note 21, at 181. 
29 Galves, supra note 21, at 181. 
30 Id. 
31 See, e.g., Verizon, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 138; Lori G. Baer & Christopher A. Riley, Technology in the Courtroom: 
Computerized Exhibits and How to Present Them, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 176, 177 (1999); Timothy W. Cerniglia, 
Computer-Generated Exhibits—Demonstrative, Substantive or Pedagogical—Their Place in Evidence, 18 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 5 (1994). 
32 BROUN ET AL., supra note 22, at 383. 
33 Galves, supra note 21, at 183-85; Cerniglia, supra note 31, at 5. 
34 Elan E. Weinreb, ‘Counselor, Proceed with Caution’: The Use of Integrated Evidence Presentation Systems and 
Computer-Generated Evidence in the Courtroom, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 404 (2001). 
35 Galves, supra note 21, at 184. 
7 
 
 Recreations, when they are distinguished from simulations, are described as falling 
somewhere between animations and simulations.36  They are sometimes referred to as 
“recreation animations.”37  Recreations differ from animations in that they are meant to illustrate 
the actual event as it happened, but they illustrate an expert’s pre-existing theory of the event.38  
Recreations differ from simulations in that simulations do not illustrate the expert’s pre-existing 
theory, but rather, the expert used the simulation in forming his opinion as to what occurred.39 
 The final category of CGEs is the computer model.  Computer models, like simulations, 
involve the input of data into a computer, which then runs the data through formulae based on 
scientific principles.40  Using a computer model, an expert can test multiple hypotheses and form 
an opinion based on the results.41  Computer models differ from simulations only in that visual 
images are not necessarily created by computer models, as they are with simulations.42 
 With all types of CGEs, the attorney wishing to use them in court must have a thorough 
understanding of the applicable evidentiary standards and potential barriers to admissibility for 
such evidence.  A detailed discussion of possible evidentiary issues is beyond the scope of this 
paper.   To cite but one example, however, animations, which merely illustrate the testimony of a 
witness, are generally treated as demonstrative evidence and are admissible so long as they are 
(1) authentic; (2) relevant; (3) a fair and accurate representation of the evidence to which they 
purport to relate; and (4) have a probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.43  Because they are offered for limited demonstrative purposes, 
                                                 
36 BROUN ET AL., supra note 22, at 384-85. 
37 Id. at 376, 385; Galves supra note 21, at 183. 
38 BROUN ET AL., supra note 22, at 384. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 136, 138 (E.D. N.Y. 2004) 
42 BROUN ET AL., supra note 21, at 384; Cerniglia, supra note 31, at 6. 
43 See, e.g., People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607 (Colo. App. 2001); Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.E.2d 528, 536 (S.C. 
2000). 
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animations may be excluded if they contain information beyond the testimony which they 
accompany and purport to explain.  For instance, in State v. Stewart, a case involving the drive-
by shooting of a bicyclist, the prosecution presented an animation depicting the shooting from 
several angles, including inside the vehicle.44  The court stated the following with regard to the 
scenes from inside the vehicle, which depicted the facial expressions and movements of the 
passengers prior to firing the gun:  
[T]he animation contains a great deal of material that was based on conjecture and 
did not illustrate [the medical examiner’s] testimony on the precise record.  
Indeed, the four animation sequences depicting appellant’s face and eyes at the 
time of the shooting amounted to original evidence depicting appellant’s intent, 
the most hotly disputed element in the case.  Therefore, while it is true that the 
animation may have made it easier for [the medical examiner] to testify and may 
have been very effective in depicting the shooting, the animation’s effectiveness 
was enhanced  through artists’ renditions of facial expressions and movements 
that did not merely recreate what was on the record, but created impressions 
depicting deliberate, intentional actions favorable to the state’s theory of the 
case.45 
 
Because the animation exceeded the purpose for which it was admitted, it should have been 
excluded and the trial court erred in admitting it in its entirety.46 As this is just one example, it is 
imperative that attorneys seeking to use CGEs to present their cases thoroughly research and 
understand all of the evidentiary issues involved with the use of CGEs in litigation prior to 
expending the time and resources in creating them. 
C.  The Use of Courtroom Technology: Where Are We Now? 
The use of courtroom technology appears to be growing at a more rapid pace in the 
federal court system than in state courts.47  In fact, as early as 1999, the Judicial Conference of 
                                                 
44 643 N.W.2d 281, 283-84, 286-87 (Minn. 2002). 
45 Id. at 295. 
46 Id. 
47 See Elizabeth C. Wiggins, What We Know and What We Need to Know about the Effects of Courtroom 
Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 731, 732 (2003) (describing the rapid growth of the use of technology in 
federal courts); Frederic I. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today’s—and 
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the United States48 endorsed the use of courtroom technology, finding that it enhanced the “fact-
finding mission of federal courts” and that courtroom technologies should be considered as 
“necessary and integral parts of courtrooms undergoing construction or major renovation . . . 
[and should] be retrofitted into existing courtrooms or those undergoing tenant alterations as 
appropriate.”49  In June of 2002, the Federal Judicial Center surveyed all federal district courts 
on available technologies.50  According to the survey:  
94% of district courts have access to an evidence camera; 66% to a digital 
projector and projection screen; 93% to wiring to connect laptop computers; 57% 
to monitors built into the jury box; 77% to monitors located outside the jury box; 
89% to a monitor at the bench; 88% to a monitor at the witness stand, at counsel 
table or at the lectern; 77% to monitors or screens targeted at the audience; 80% 
to a color video printer; 91% to annotation equipment; 95% to a sound 
reinforcement system; 92% to a kill switch and control system; [and] 81% to an 
integrated lectern.51 
 
In addition, most of the federal courts surveyed reported having orientation programs available 
for court staff and attorneys wishing to familiarize themselves with the equipment and how it can 
be used in court.52 
 Since the 1990s, the American Bar Association has conducted annual surveys of law 
firms and solo-practitioners on their use of technology, including litigation support and 
courtroom technology.53  A review of the surveys makes clear that the use of courtroom 
technology is on the rise.  For example, whereas the 2007 survey indicated that only 32% of 
                                                                                                                               
Tomorrow’s—High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. REV. 799, 800 (1999) (noting that as of 1998 only eight 
state court facilities qualified as “high-technology” compared with thirty-two federal courts).   
48 The Judicial Conference of the United States, established by 28 U.S.C. § 331, acts as the “governing body of the 
federal courts” and has the fundamental purpose of making “policy with regard to the administration of the U.S. 
courts.”  Wiggins, supra note 47, at 731 n.1. 
49 REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE U.S. JUD. CONF. 8 (1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/99-
Mar.pdf. 
50 Wiggins, supra note 47, at 733 (describing the questionnaire and noting that “[n]inety of the ninety-four districts 
responded to the survey”). 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 734. 
53 ABA, 2003 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: LITIGATION AND COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY vii (2004) 
[hereinafter 2003 ABA Survey Report]. 
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respondents had litigation support software available at their firms, by 2009 that number had 
risen to 57%.54  Similarly, 47% of respondents in the 2009 survey indicated using a laptop in the 
courtroom, primarily for presentation purposes, up from 37% in the 2007 survey and just 16% in 
the 2003 survey.55  Likewise, by 2009, the availability of flat-panel LCD monitors was up to 
42%, compared with 33% in the 2008 survey, and integrated lecterns was up to 38%, compared 
with 21% in 2008 and just 13% in 2003.56  Moreover, it is important to remember that even when 
the courtroom itself is not equipment with a particular type of technology, technology owned by 
the lawyer or law firm or rented from a vendor can be brought into the courtroom for use in a 
particular trial as well.57  This is so even if the courtroom’s own “technological capabilities” 
consist of nothing more than electrical outlets.58 
 Where a courtroom has been outfitted with visual display technology, the use of the 
technology can be categorized as either permissive or mandatory.59  In most courts, the decision 
of whether to use the available technology is left to the lawyer.60  Use of the installed equipment, 
especially in federal court and in a document-heavy case, however, is sometimes mandatory.61  
For example, one federal judge has a ten document cut-off, such that “if the case involves more 
than 10 documentary exhibits, lawyers are required to use the display equipment” for the 
exhibits.62  Moreover, where the use of courtroom technology is mandatory, it is often reported 
                                                 
54 ABA, 2009 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT III-xiv (2009) [Hereinafter 2009 ABA Survey Report]. 
55 Id. at III-ix; 2003 ABA Survey Report, supra note 53, at xv. 
56 2009 ABA Survey Report, supra note 54, at III-x; 2003 ABA Survey Report, supra note 53, at xvi. 
57 LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 11, at 2; Lynn A. Epstein, The Technology Challenge: Lawyers have Finally 
Entered the Race But Will Ethical Hurdles Slow the Pace?, 28 NOVA L. REV. 721, 739-40 (2003). 
58 LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 11, at 48. 
59 Lederer, supra note 8, at 43. 
60 LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 11, at 49. 
61 Id.; Lederer, supra note 8, at 43. 
62 LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 11, at 49. 
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that after the initial mandatory use, lawyers become “believers” in the efficiency of technology 
and continue to use it.63   
II.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF USING COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY TO VISUALLY PRESENT EVIDENCE 
 We have all heard the old clichés “a picture is worth a thousand words” and “seeing is 
believing.”  Even case law is littered with commentary on the effectiveness of visually presented 
evidence, and sometimes even to the extent of inferring prejudice therefrom.64  The effectiveness 
of visually presenting information also has substantial scientific support, however.  Indeed, the 
abundance of studies and theories supporting the effectiveness of visually presenting information 
serves to justify the every-increasing role technology plays in modern litigation and ensures that 
it is not only the current “trend,” but the future of courtroom practice.     
A.  Memory and the Visual Image: Visually Presenting Information Leads to Better 
Comprehension and Retention of the Information Presented 
 
 At the most basic level, memory can be described as including three inter-connected 
stages: (1) the encoding stage, which describes the process by which “information is introduced 
and significance is attached”; (2) the storage stage, which describes the process through which 
information is retained; and (3) the retrieval stage, which describes the process by which 
                                                 
63 Id.   
64 See, e.g., Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., No. 92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994) 
(“Relying on the old adage, ‘seeing is believing,’ we conclude that the jury may give undue weight to an animated 
reconstruction of the accident. . . . Because the expert’s conclusion would be graphically depicted in a moving and 
animated form, the viewing of the computer simulation might more readily lead the jury to accept the data and 
premises underlying the defendant’s expert’s opinion, and, therefore, to give more weight to such opinion than it 
might if the jury were forced to evaluate the expert’s conclusions in the light of the testimony of all witnesses, as 
generally occurs in such cases.”); Van Houten-Maynard v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 89C0377, 1995 WL 317056, at 
*12 (N.C. Ill. May 23, 1995) (“[T]his type of evidence can be highly influential upon a jury, well beyond its 
reliability and materiality, due to its documentary-type format presented in a “television” like medium. . . . 
[C]omputer animation evidence, by reasons of its being in a format that represents the latest rage and wrinkle in 
video communications and entertainment, may well have an undue detrimental effect on other more reliable and 
trustworthy direct-type evidence.”); Sommervold v. Grevlos, 518 N.W.2d 733, 737 (S.D. 1994) (“When people see 
something on television, they think it is real even when it is not.”); Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.E.2d 528, 536 (S.C. 
2000) (noting that animations have “the potential to create lasting impressions that unduly override other testimony 
or evidence”).  
12 
 
memory is “accessed and ultimately utilized.”65  Visual imagery can enhance the memory 
process in all three phases.66 
 With regard to the encoding stage, visually presenting information can assist the jury in 
several ways.  First, in order for information to be understood, assimilated, and believed by the 
jury, the information presented must be imaginable.67  That is, it must prompt some sort of 
sensory imagery.68  When oral testimony is in complex or abstract terms, jurors may be unable to 
create a mental image of what is being described and, therefore, will be less likely to understand 
and believe it.69  Using a visual aid to accompany the oral testimony solves this dilemma by 
supplying the jury with an image of the message being conveyed.  Moreover, by supplying the 
image for the jury, the attorney has control over the image the jury perceives, rather than leaving 
each juror to create their own individualized mental image.70 For example, upon hearing the 
word “dog,” each juror will have a different image spring to mind.  Some may picture a Collie, 
while others think of a Labrador.  If, however, the attorney says the word “dog” and 
simultaneously projects the image of a vicious pit bull onto the screen, the jurors will all share 
the same mental image and will more easily and accurately understand the “dog” referred to in 
the testimony.71 
 Second, a visual aid will assist the jury through proximity, meaning that it will decrease 
the number of mental steps each juror must take in order to understand the information being 
presented.72  Rather than hearing the information described verbally and then having to create 
their own mental image, which is an indirect process, the jurors receive the information directly, 
                                                 
65 GALLANT ET AL., supra note 17, at 188. 
66 Id. 
67 Galves, supra note 21, at 188. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 186-87. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 188-89. 
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through an actual image.73 Third, accompanying oral testimony with a visual image assists in the 
encoding process simply in that it supplies the jury with two avenues through which to receive 
the information.74  Thus, the information is more easily understood and processed on a deeper 
level.75  And finally, the visual presentation of information using courtroom technology may 
better assist jurors in the encoding process simply because it is what they are accustomed to.76  
Today, “visual imagery accompanies much of the information that people seek or to which they 
are exposed.”77  From television, to the internet, to electronic billboards, high-tech visual 
imagery is a pervasive component of modern communication.78  Visually presented information 
may, therefore, be more effective simply in that it is how we receive most of our information 
today. 
 As for the storage stage of memory, it is well established that information presented 
visually is better retained than information presented only verbally.79  A seminal study 
examining the effect of visual communication on learning was the 1963Weiss-McGrath Report.80  
The study compared participant’s short-term and long-term retention of information presented 
using three different methods: (1) verbal presentation; (2) visual presentation; and (3) combined 
                                                 
73 Id. at 189. 
74 GALLANT ET AL., supra note 17, at 189. 
75 Id. 
76 J. Bradley Ponder, But Look over Here: How the Use of Technology at Trial Mesmerizes Jurors and Secures 
Verdicts, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 289, 292 (2005) (“Fox News, USA Today, and other modern media outlets have 
bombarded the public with neat graphs, fast news tickers, and weather charts.  This ‘bullet-point’ learning is the 
simple reality of the modern juror.  Providing jurors with similar technology places jurors at ease because it is what 
they are accustomed to learning from.”); Galves, supra note 21, at 191 (“An attorney can either ignore the fact that 
jurors get most of their information from television (sight and hearing) rather than just the spoken word (hearing) or 
even the written word (sight), or the attorney can choose to connect with jurors in a way that the juror is comfortable 
and in a manner that the juror is accustomed to before ever stepping into the courtroom.”). 
77 Fred Galves, Will Video Kill the Radio Star? Visual Learning and the Use of Display Technology in the Law 
School Classroom, 2004 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 195, 201 (2004). 
78 Id. 
79 GALLANT ET AL., supra note 17, at 193. 
80 Id. at 194. 
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verbal and visual presentation.81  After seventy-two hours, participants retained just ten percent 
of information presented only verbally and twenty percent of information presented only 
visually.82  In contrast, when the information was presented both verbally and visually, 
participants retained sixty-five percent of the information, or more than six times the information 
that was retained from verbal presentation alone.83 
 The drastic increase in retention when information is presented both visually and verbally 
can be explained by what is known as the “dual-coding theory.”84  Dual-coding theory is based 
on the idea that information presented verbally is encoded differently than information presented 
visually.85  Simply put: 
Verbal information is encoded with a verbal trace whereby a narrative enters the 
memory and is stored as a verbal story.  However, visual information or 
information that can be easily imagined in a visual form is encoded with both 
types of information—a verbal code and a visual code.  Thus, a visual memory 
has an attached verbal description, and hence, visual memory is actually encoded 
twice.  This redundant encoding process maximizes the likelihood of visual 
memories being retained over time and ultimately quickly retrieved because even 
if some of the memory is degraded (e.g., some of the verbal information is lost), 
the visual information is likely to remain, allowing the individual to access the 
stored information.86 
 
The dual-coding theory of memory was first introduced in the 1970s by Allan Paivio.87  Studies 
replicating Paivio’s findings have been conducted over the years.88 
                                                 
81 Adam T. Berkoff, Computer Simulations in Litigation: Are Television Generation Jurors being Misled, 77 MARQ. 
L. REV. 829, 845-46 (1994). 
82 Id. at 846. 
83 Id. 
84 GALLANT ET AL., supra note 17, at 193. 
85 Id. 
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88 See, e.g., Stephen A. Dewhurst & Martin A. Conway, Pictures, Images, and Recollective Experience, 20 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: LEARNING, MEMORY, AND COGNITION 1088 (1994); Richard E. Mayer & Valerie K. Sims, 
For Whom is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Extensions of a Dual-Coding Theory of Multimedia Learning, 86 
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  With regard to the retrieval stage of memory, accompanying oral testimony with visual 
imagery will also increase the juror’s ability to retrieve the information presented.  This is so 
because memories that are encoded through multi-sensory means (i.e. verbal and visual 
presentation) can also be retrieved through a multisensory process (i.e. both verbal and visual 
cues can lead to memory retrieval).89 
 The enhanced comprehension that results from the visual presentation of information 
may be even more dramatic when the information presented is otherwise complex and difficult to 
understand.90  A moving visual, such as a computer animation or simulation, may be especially 
helpful.  Indeed, one might argue that it is akin to the difference between showing a child how to 
tie his shoes and giving him written instructions on how to do so.91   For example, one 
commentator offered the following description of how a computer simulation facilitated juror 
understanding in a complex case involving a gas leak that resulted in multiple explosions: 
If a computer simulation would not have been used, “the jury would have had to 
digest cumbersome traditional forms of demonstrative evidence needed to make 
the same points: diagrams of the chemical plant, maps of the city sewer system, 
eyewitness accounts of the explosion, and expert testimony on gas chemistry.”  
Instead, with the use of a computer simulation, the jury was ostensibly able to 
“see” what happened.  Two days after the jury was shown the computer 
simulation of the hexane explosion, the defendant settled the case for over $18 
million.92 
 
Thus, especially where the issues involved in the litigation are highly technical, the use of CGEs 
can greatly improve the jury’s ability to comprehend the complexities of the case.   
                                                 
89 GALLANT ET AL., supra note 17, at 192. 
90 See FREDERIC I. LEDERER, COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY FROM THE JUDGE’S PERSPECTIVE 4 (1997), available at 
http://www.legaltechcenter.net/media/articles/judge.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (“Some testimony is almost 
useless without a visual component.  The workings of a machine, interior of a body, or even a complicated street 
intersection cry out for a visual explanation.”); Galves, supra note 21, at 168-69 (explaining that because the issues 
involved in litigation have become more complex, CGEs are now necessary to explain the complexities of the case 
in a way that jurors can understand). 
91 See Eli Chernow, Video in the Courtroom: More than a Talking Head, 15 LITIGATION 3, 4 (1998) (“The 
difference between video and alternative evidence is like the difference between showing a child how to tie his 
shoes and giving him written instruction.”). 
92 Berkhoff, supra note 81, at 846-47. 
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B.  The Persuasive Impact of Visually Presented Information 
 Along with increased comprehension and retention of the information presented, visually 
presented information is simply more persuasive than mere verbal descriptions.93  This is due, in 
part at least, to what is known as the “vividness effect.”94  The vividness effect is based on “the 
idea that information has a greater impact on social judgment when it is highly imaginable than 
when it is pallid.”95  For example, studies show that mock jurors are more likely to accept 
testimony as true if it contains vivid details, such as “the defendant knocked over a bowl of 
guacamole dip, which splattered all over the white shag carpet.”96  Likewise, when prompted to 
imagine the occurrence of a particular event, people later view that event as more plausible and 
more likely to have occurred.97  Thus, the use of courtroom technology to visually present 
information, which can aid the jury in creating a mental image of what is being described, can be 
highly influential. 
 The persuasive impact of visually presented information may be even more dramatic 
when the information is expressed in the form of a moving CGE, such as an animation or 
simulation, especially where the information presented is something with which the viewer is 
unfamiliar.  First, studies show that people are poor intuitive physicists.98  That is, they do not 
intuitively understand the basic laws of motion.  So, for example, one study found that when 
asked to predict the path of a ball rolling out of a spiral tube, most subjects incorrectly predicted 
                                                 
93 Meghan A. Dunn et al., The Jury Persuaded (and Not): Computer Animations in the Courtroom, 28 LAW & POL’Y 
228, 229 (2006) (“Visual aids are more persuasive to jurors than verbal descriptions of that same evidence, 
regardless of whether the visual aid is a photograph (Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff 1997), a videotape (Kassin & 
Garfield 1991), or the actual object itself (Wasserman & Robinson 1980).”). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Saul M. Kassin & Meghan A. Dunn, Computer-Animated Displays and the Jury: Facilitative and Prejudicial 
Effects, 21 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 269, 270 (1997). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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that the ball would follow a curved path upon exiting the tube.99  Similarly, another study found 
that when asked to predict the path of a ball dropped from a moving object, most people 
incorrectly assume that the ball will drop straight down as opposed to in a forward trajectory.100  
Thus, people may be highly influenced by moving CGEs depicting physical events.   
Second, research indicates that as jurors hear the evidence at trial, they construct a 
plausible narrative that fits the evidence and explains what occurred.101  In other words, jurors 
use the evidence to construct a story and then choose the verdict most similar to their story.102  A 
computer animation presents the jury with a ready-made narrative of the event at issue and, 
where the scenario is an unfamiliar one, the jury is especially likely to accept it as true.103   
 For example, in a 2006 study entitled, “The Jury Persuaded (and Not): Computer 
Animation in the Courtroom,” the authors compared the effectiveness of animations to traditional 
diagrams in two mock trials, one involving a plane crash and the other, a car accident.104  In the 
plane crash group, participants watched a videotaped simulation of a civil trial resulting from a 
plane crash.105  In the case, the pilot was killed after his plane crashed in the woods, not from the 
crash itself, but from exposure after the electronic locator transmitter (ELT) malfunctioned.106  
The plaintiff argued that the latching mechanism for the ELT was defectively designed, while the 
defendant argued that the crash was so severe that no latching mechanism could have saved the 
ELT.107  In the car accident group, participants watched a simulated wrongful-death trial 
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101 Dunn et al., supra note 93, at 230. 
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resulting from a car accident in which the decedent’s car was broadsided by a semi-truck.108  The 
plaintiff argued that the defendant was speeding and that had he been traveling at or below the 
speed limit, the decedent would have safely completed his turn.109  The defendant argued that the 
truck driver was not speeding.110  In each group, participants were placed in one of four cells: (1) 
plaintiff animation; (2) plaintiff diagram; (3) defendant animation; (4) defendant diagram.111   
 As the authors hypothesized, the animation significantly influenced verdicts in the plane 
crash trial, but not in the car accident trial.112  Specifically, in the plane crash scenario, a situation 
with which most people are unfamiliar, when both plaintiff and defendant presented diagrams, 
32% of participants found for plaintiff.  When the plaintiff presented an animation, and the 
defendant presented a diagram, however, 68% of participants found in favor of the plaintiff.113  
In the car accident scenario, which is easier for most people to visualize than a plane crash, the 
animation was not significantly more effective than the diagram.114  This supports the hypothesis 
that an animation depicting an unfamiliar situation can persuade jurors in favor of the side 
presenting the display.  Where the animation depicts a situation with which participants are 
already familiar, however, it does not appear to be substantially more persuasive than a more 
simple visual aid, such as a diagram.115 
C.  Courtroom Technology: Other Benefits 
 In addition to its persuasive impact and enhanced juror comprehension and retention of 
the information presented, using courtroom technology to visually present one’s case has many 
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other benefits. For one, technology can shorten the overall length of trials.116  The use of 
evidence presentation technology is estimated to save anywhere between twenty-five and fifty-
percent of the time otherwise necessary to present a case.117  
Even more, the attorney who has a mastery of courtroom technology and is able to 
retrieve documents or other pieces of evidence quickly, rather than digging through piles of 
paper, will appear both competent and prepared.118  Essentially, by using courtroom technology 
to visually present your case, “[y]ou are sending several messages to the jury: that this case is 
important enough to warrant the best technology, that you are doing all you can to help the jury 
understand the case, and that you are a competent professional.”119  Moreover, attorneys must 
remember that some jurors may even expect them to use technology in the courtroom.  Many of 
the people sitting on the jury either own or use a computer every day.  As such, an attorney’s 
failure to use technology in presenting their case, especially if opposing counsel has done so, will 
not only be noticed by the computer-users in the jury, but they may also “second-guess” the 
attorney for failing to do what they could have to make things more clear.120   
Finally, courtroom technology can enable an attorney to control the room.  As evidenced 
by the prosecution’s “seamless performance” in the Michael Skakel murder trial, using 
courtroom technology to present one’s case enables the attorney “to clarify, to captivate, and to 
convince.”121  That is, “[c]ounsel decides when the jurors look at the screen, and when they focus 
on him or her.”122  Indeed, “some of the most powerful moments in court occur just after 
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technology has been used—when the screen goes dark—and the attention shifts back to counsel 
and his or her story.”123 
III.  COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY AND THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
 Because of the many benefits of using courtroom technology to present one’s case, the 
use of courtroom technology will only continue to rise.  Indeed, the adversary process itself will 
likely lead to this result as lawyers realize that an unwillingness to take advantage of courtroom 
technology, especially when one’s opponent does, is an unacceptable risk.124  Two important 
questions necessarily follow.  First, what ethical considerations are implicated as technology-
augmented litigation becomes the norm? And second, do the current Model Rules adequately 
address those ethical concerns? 
A.  The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
 1.  The Road to the Current Model Rules 
 A long history precedes the current version of the Model Rules.  Indeed, its lineage 
stretches all the way back to 1908, when the ABA approved its first set of Canons of 
Professional Ethics.125  By the 1960s, many lawyers felt that the Canons no longer provided 
sufficient guidance for modern law practice.126  In response, and as is still the process today, the 
ABA created a special committee to evaluate the Canons in light of the needs of lawyers at the 
time.127  That committee, known as the Wright Committee, produced the ABA Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, which was adopted by the ABA in 1969.128  
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The next set of changes were initiated in 1977, when the ABA created the Kutak 
Commission.129  The Kutak Commission produced the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which the ABA adopted in 1983.130  The Model Rules abandoned the Model Code’s 
format of canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules, for a more restatement-like 
format of rules with official “comments.”131  Most states eventually adopted the 1983 Model 
Rules, subject to various non-uniform provisions, but not nearly as quickly as they did with the 
Model Code.132 
As a result of dramatic changes in the practice of law that occurred during the 1980s and 
90s, especially in connection with the increase in interstate and international law practice, in 
1997 the ABA created the Ethics 2000 Commission to once again evaluate the Model Rules.133  
Between 2001 and 2003, the ABA adopted most of the Ethics 2000 Commission’s 
recommendations, amounting to an extensive revision to the Model Rules.134  Most states have 
now adopted all or most of these changes, with some variations, although some states are still in 
the process of considering whether to do so.135 
2.  The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 
In 2009, the ABA created the Commission on Ethics 20/20 (“the Commission”) to assess 
the adequacy of the current Model Rules in light of modern technological advances and the 
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increased globalization of the practice of law.136  The Commission’s work is expected to take 
three years, with the first year dedicated to research, and the second and third years dedicated to 
developing and vetting proposed policies and principles and presenting them to the ABA’s 
House of Delegates for approval.137 
The Commission has identified three focus areas: 
(1) issues that arise because U.S. lawyers are regulated by states but work 
increasingly across state and international borders; (2) issues that arise in light of 
current and future advances in technology that enhance virtual cross-border 
access; and (3) particular ethical issues raised by changing technology.138 
 
Thus, the effects of technological advances on the ethical duties of lawyers is clearly one of the 
Commission’s primary focuses.  Courtroom technology, however, is not specifically set out as an 
area of concern in the Preliminary Issues Outline.139  The most relevant topic in the Preliminary 
Issues Outline is “Competence: Does the rapid pace of technological evolution raise issues 
relating to lawyer competence.”140 Because technology-augmented litigation is steadily 
becoming the norm for modern courtroom practice, the Commission should consider, as part of 
its technology discussion, whether the Model Rules adequately cover the use of courtroom 
technology. 
B.  Courtroom Technology under the Current Rules 
 The Model Rules do not specifically address technology or how technological advances 
affect a lawyer’s ethical duties.  The lack of an explicit reference to technology notwithstanding, 
however, technological advances can affect a lawyer’s duties even under the current Model 
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Rules.  Specifically, when it comes to technology-related issues, the duties of confidentiality, 
competence, and diligence are the duties most often implicated.   
For example, when sending an electronic document to third-parties, lawyer may need to 
consider whether they are also transmitting confidential client-information as metadata.  Meta-
data, which accompanies electronic documents, can reveal information regarding the authorship 
of a document and changes made during drafting including, among other things, deletions.141  
Some state bar opinions have held that, in order to avoid violating the duties of competence and 
confidentiality, attorneys must take reasonable steps to safeguard against revealing such 
information.142  Some states have also held that lawyers may not ethically attempt to “mine” for 
such data when receiving electronic documents.143  Similarly, the duties of confidentiality, 
competence, and diligence have been implicated in other technology-related areas such as e-
discovery144, switching to a paperless filing system145, and conducting online research146.   
 The current Model Rules that might be implicated with regard to the use of courtroom 
technology include: (1) Rule 1.1, requiring competence; (2) Rule 1.3, requiring diligence; and (3) 
Rule 1.5, requiring reasonable fees.  Although all three rules could be interpreted so as to cover 
courtroom technology, an examination of each reveals that many questions are left unanswered. 
                                                 
141 Prof’l Ethics of the Fl. Bar, Ethics Op. 06-2 (2006), available at http://www.floridabar.org/ 
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 1.  The Duty of Competence 
According to Model Rule 1.1, competence “requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”147  The comments 
indicate that in order to maintain the knowledge and skill required for competent representation, 
“a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice.”148  Indeed, even the 
ABA’s own website indicates that “[c]ompetence in using technology can be a requirement of 
practicing law.”149  Thus, one could argue that as using courtroom technology to visually display 
evidence becomes the standard, the duty of competence will require lawyers to adjust 
accordingly.  That is, at a minimum, lawyers should have a general understanding of how to use 
courtroom technology in presenting their cases.150  Of course, such a duty, if there is one, would 
also require an understanding of the evidentiary requirements for admissibility for both the 
demonstrative and substantive uses of CGEs. 
The comments to Model Rule 1.1 also indicate that the requisite thoroughness and 
preparation “are determined in part by what is at stake.”151  That is, major or complex litigation 
may require more preparation and treatment to satisfy the competency requirement.  Thus, a 
complex patent or similar case that requires the jury to understand a detailed scientific process 
may require more preparation and treatment than an uncomplicated contract dispute.  If the use 
of a simple visual aid to explain the scientific process involved would greatly improve the jury’s 
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ability to understand a pivotal issue in the case, would the duty of competent representation 
require the lawyer to use one?   
Assuming that the duty of competence does entail an obligation to be even minimally 
competent in the use of courtroom technology, further questions still arise.  One example would 
be whether and to what extent the lawyer who does use courtroom technology to present her case 
must also be prepared in the event that technology fails.152  If an evidence camera stops working 
in the middle of trial, for example, because the light bulb failed, must the “adequately prepared” 
attorney have a spare light bulb on hand, acetate transparancies ready to place on an overhead 
projector instead, or paper copies of the exhibits available to pass to the jurors?153  If the 
courtroom itself was equipped with the camera, can the attorney depend on the court to also 
supply a spare bulb?154  If the attorney intends to use a simple PowerPoint presentation, would 
simply bringing an extra copy of the presentation on a CD or flash drive be sufficient?  Or should 
the attorney also bring a copy of the Microsoft software program that would be necessary to view 
it on another computer?  Should an attorney using her own laptop for presentation purposes be 
prepared with a second laptop in the event the first laptop crashes?  In other words, even if one 
believes that the duty of competence requires lawyers to be capable of using courtroom 
technology, which is uncertain under the current Model Rules, the question of whether and to 
what extent the “thoroughness and preparation” element of that duty requires lawyers to be 
prepared for technology failures is also open for discussion. 
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2.  The Duty of Reasonable Diligence 
 Whereas the Model Code explicitly included a duty of zealous representation, the current 
Model Rules have reshaped that duty into a combination of the duties of competence and diligent 
representation.155  Because of fears that the term “zealous” could slip into “overzealous,” no 
Model Rule contains an outright duty of zeal.156  The comments, however, do refer to an 
obligation of zealous representation: (1) “A lawyer must also act with . . . zeal in advocacy upon 
the client’s behalf”157; (2) “[W]hen an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a 
zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done”158; 
and (3) “[T]he lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, 
within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude 
toward all persons involved in the legal system.”159   
Considering all three of these comments and the many benefits to using courtroom 
technology to visually present one’s case, one might assume that diligent representation requires 
attorneys to visually present their cases using courtroom technology, especially where opposing 
counsel is doing so.  To be sure, when surveyed, many attorneys indicate that if opposing 
counsel is using litigation support software, they would be inclined to do so as well.160  One 
defense attorney, after unsuccessfully objecting to the prosecution’s use of a computer slide 
show in closing arguments, confessed to reporters that his own arguments had appeared 
“slipshod in comparison.”161  And, as previously discussed, many computer-savvy jurors may 
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even expect attorneys to use technology in presenting their cases.162  The comments to Model 
Rule 1.3’s duty of reasonable diligence, however, also provide that lawyers are “not bound . . . to 
press for every advantage that might be realized for a client.”163  This statement alone makes it 
difficult to argue that the current diligence requirement includes a duty to use courtroom 
technology to present one’s case, even in the situation where one’s opponent is doing so.   
3.  The Duty to Keep Fees Reasonable 
The duties of competence and diligence must be balanced against the countervailing duty 
to keep fees reasonable, which is set out in Model Rule 1.5.164  The rule itself requires that 
lawyers’ fees be reasonable and sets out a non-exclusive list of factors to consider.  Thus, there is 
substantial room for discretion in determining a proper fee.165  Essentially, it is a balancing 
process under which attorneys must avoid leaning too far toward minimizing fees, and thereby 
potentially violating the duties of diligence and competence, nor leaning too far toward zealous 
representation, and possibility violating the duty to minimize fees.166   
When it comes to courtroom technology, it is a question of balancing the cost and 
effectiveness of a given evidence display technology or particular CGE.  For example, because 
moving CGEs, such as animations and simulations, can cost upwards of $5,000 to produce, 
attorneys must have an adequate knowledge of when and why one would want to use such 
evidence.167  Some potential guidelines that have been suggested by commentators include the 
following: (1) whether your case involves a risk of exposure in excess of $500,000; (2) whether 
your case creates a “story” that should be presented clearly; (3) whether your case hinges in 
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causation; (4) whether your case involves complex expert testimony; and (5) whether your 
opponent is using an animation or simulation, which you should attack with one of your own.168  
More simple CGEs, on the other hand, such as static or enhanced images, can be used much 
more frequently and cost-effectively, especially where the courtroom itself is equipment with the 
evidence display technology.  Even if the courtroom itself is not equipped, most of the basic 
evidence display technologies, such as evidence cameras and digital projectors, can be purchased 
or even rented at a relatively low cost.169 
C.  Considerations for the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 
There are numerous benefits to using courtroom technology to visually present one’s 
case: increased juror comprehension and retention of the information presented, increased 
persuasive power, increase efficiency, the appearance of competence and preparedness, and the 
ability to control the room.  As such, using courtroom technology will soon be, if it is not 
already, standard practice in modern litigation.  Therefore, as part of its technology discussions, 
the Commission should consider the use of courtroom technology specifically and whether the 
Model Rules themselves, or at least their comments, need to be amended to better address it. 
Of the three rules discussed that might relate to courtroom technology, the fee issue is the 
probably the most sufficiently addressed under the current Model Rules.  This is so simply 
because the rule itself does not impose a “bright line” fee structure, but rather leaves room for 
discretion.  Thus, whether the effectiveness of using a particular type of courtroom technology is 
valid justification for the potential increase in the attorney’s fee is also subject to discretion.  The 
duties of competent and diligent representation, on the other hand, could be read either way.  
That is, perhaps a lawyer’s duties of competent and diligent representation require that she be 
                                                 
168 Id. 
169 LAWYER’S GUIDE, supra note 11, at 53. 
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familiar with how to use courtroom technology and when and why one should do so, but perhaps 
not.  Because of clear message of the comments to Model Rule 1.3 on diligence—that lawyers do 
not have an ethical obligation to “press for every advantage that might be realized for a client”170 
—it is unlikely that courtroom technology can be addressed under that rule, short of deleting that 
comment altogether.  Thus, the real issue here lies in the duty of competence and its affect on the 
use of courtroom technology.171   
Specifically, as part of its technology discussion, the Commission should consider, first, 
whether lawyers have an ethical obligation to be minimally competent in the use of courtroom 
technology when advocating for their clients, which this author would suggest they do, and 
second, whether the current Model Rule on competence adequately expresses that duty, which 
this author would suggest it does not.  It is not necessary, however, to drastically reword Model 
Rule 1.1 to make the duty clear.  Indeed, an additional comment to the rule would be more than 
sufficient.  A possible starting point for discussion is the following:   
Maintaining the requisite knowledge and skill necessary for competent 
representation includes a duty to keep abreast of technological advances that 
significantly affect the practice of law.  For example, in certain circumstances, 
lawyers may have an ethical obligation to use courtroom technology in 
advocating for their clients and to be competent in the use of technology when 
doing so.  
 
The structure of a comment like this allows not only for courtroom technology to be addressed, 
but other areas in which technology has affected the practice of law as well.  That is, other “for 
example” sentences could follow, further clarifying how and in what circumstances technology 
shapes the duty of competence. 
                                                 
170 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.3 cmt. 1 (2004). 
171 See Epstein, supra note 57, at 741 (“[A]s more attorneys become familiar with courtroom technology, future 
changes to the Model Rules may be required to tackle the ethical concerns relating to courtroom presentation of 
evidence.”). 
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Finally, regardless of whether the Commission modifies the Model Rules to address 
courtroom technology, trial lawyers must still consider this issue even in light of the rules as they 
are today.  That is, trial lawyers need to apply their current understanding of the duties of 
competence, diligence, and reasonable fees to this new area of the law.  Only those lawyers who 
have done so will be adequately prepared to defend themselves in the event their compliance 
with these obligations is ever challenged for failing to utilize courtroom technology in 
advocating for their clients.172 
CONCLUSION 
 As trial attorneys become aware of the many benefits to using courtroom technology in 
presenting their cases, technology-augmented litigation will become standard practice.  As such, 
the Model Rules should address the ethical duties of attorneys with regard to the use of 
courtroom technology, even if only to clarify that a minimal competence in the use of courtroom 
technology is, in fact, an ethical obligation for all trial attorneys.  Courtroom technology should, 
therefore, be considered by the Commission as part of its discussions on modern technology and 
the practice of law.   
   
   
          
                                                 
172 Cf. DALE M. CENDALI ET AL., PRACTISING LAW INST., POTENTIAL ETHICAL PITFALL IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
109 (2007) (explaining that lawyers should apply the well-established ethical rules to the area of e-discovery, for 
which there isn’t explicit ethical guidance, “as parties who are prepared and take reasonable steps to comply with 
their [ethical] obligations will be in a better position to defend their efforts” with regard to e-data than parties who 
fail to do so). 
